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DON’T FIX WHAT AIN’T BROKEN—OFF-LABEL
MARKETING, THE FDA’S REGULATORY REGIME, AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Loren Jacobson

INTRODUCTION
In 1962, Congress passed the Kefauver-Harris Amendments to the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), requiring that drugs and devices be
approved for safety and effectiveness for a particular use before companies
could market them for that use. Prior to the amendments, once a manufacturer
had a product approved for safety, it could market the product for any use
whatsoever, regardless of effectiveness. The Congressional hearings leading up
to the amendments demonstrated a pattern and practice of false and misleading
promotion of drugs by the pharmaceutical industry.1 These promotional
practices encouraged physicians to prescribe drugs with very serious side effects
for uses that were not proven to be effective. For example, Mellaril, which was
reserved as a drug of last resort for schizophrenia because of its severe side
effects and was pulled off the market in 2005 due to concerns that it increased
the risk of cardiac arrhythmias and could cause sudden death,2 was widely
promoted for pregnant women with emotional symptoms in connection with
childbirth, for chronic fatigue, insomnia, anxiety, apprehension, and vague
digestive disorders.3 Diethylstilbestrol (DES) was marketed widely to prevent
miscarriage, even in normal pregnancies. But DES caused a high rate of
reproductive abnormalities in the children of women given DES, including a rare
form of vaginal cancer in girls, and a later study of the drug showed it to be
completely ineffective in preventing miscarriages.4 Without regulations
requiring that drug companies prove their products to be safe and effective for a
particular use before marketing them for that use, thousands of Americans
suffered adverse consequences from drugs that were not even effective for the
uses for which they were being promoted, often on the basis of anecdotal or
other unreliable evidence.



Assistant Professor of Law, UNT-Dallas College of Law.
Henry A. Waxman, A History of Adverse Drug Experiences: Congress Had Ample Evidence to Support
Restrictions on the Promotion of Prescription Drugs, 58 FOOD & DRUG. L. J. 299 (2003).
2
Antipsychotic Mellaril Removed from the Market, http://www.schizophrenia.com/sznews/archives/
001377.html (last visited July 5, 2017).
3
Waxman, supra n.1, at 304.
4
Id. at 306.
1
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Yet ever since the Kefauver-Harris Amendments were put into place,
pharmaceutical and device companies, whose ostensible purpose is to “work[]
together for patients” and to “work together for a healthier world,”5 have sought
to undermine the prohibition on marketing until safety and effectiveness have
been established. The companies and their defenders claim that the system is
broken because marketing restrictions prevent patients with few other
alternatives from getting life-saving drugs and devices and that the clinical trials
required to “satisfy the FDA’s demanding standards” are expensive.6
The companies and their lobbyists have made some legislative in-roads.
Last year, the state of Arizona passed a bill specifically allowing “a
pharmaceutical manufacturer or its representative” to “engage in truthful
promotion of an off-label use of a drug, biological product or device,” and
prohibiting state officials from prosecuting a pharmaceutical manufacturer or
cooperating with federal officials in a prosecution or other action for off-label
promotion.7 It remains to be seen what, if any, effect the bill will have, since
Arizona likely already cooperates very little in prosecutions for off-label
marketing since the state does not have a False Claims Act that would allow the
state to recoup Medicaid payments made for prohibited off-label promotion, and
in any case, the law is likely preempted by federal law.8 In March 2017, U.S.
Congressman Morgan Griffith introduced the “Medical Product
Communications Act of 2017,” which seeks to amend the FDCA by allowing
companies to make any communication about a product so long as it is
“supported by scientifically appropriate and statistically sound data, studies, or
analyses,” which according to the bill, includes dissemination of scientific
findings in “lay media” and “letters to the editor in defense of public

5
“Working Together for Patients” is a slogan of Bristol-Myers Squibb, see https://www.bms.com/
about-us.html (last visited July 5, 2017). “Working Together for a Healthier World” was a slogan trademarked
by Pfizer, see Pharma Marketing Blog, Pfizer Inc: Working Together for a Healthier Investor,™ Feb. 3, 2011,
http://pharmamkting.blogspot.com/2011/02/pfizer-inc-working-together-for.html (last visited July 5, 2007).
6
Stephanie M. Greene & Lars Noah, Off-Label Drug Promotion and the First Amendment, 162 U. PA.
L. REV. ONLINE 239, 250 (2014).
7
Arizona H.B. 2382. The sponsor of the bill, Arizona House Representative Phil Lovas, joined the Small
Business Association in April 2017. Mary Jo Pitzl, Arizona Rep. Phil Lovas Leaves Legislature for Trump
Administration, The Republic, azcentral.com, Apr. 14, 2017, http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/
politics/politicalinsider/2017/04/15/arizona-rep-phil-lovas-leaves-legislature-trump-administration/100471958/
(last visited July 5, 2017).
8
On preemption, see PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604 (2011); on Arizona’s lack of a False Claims
Act, see http://taf.org/states-false-claims-acts (last visited July 5, 2017).
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challenges.”9 The bill was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce,
which held a hearing on it last July, but it has not made any further progress.10
But the pharmaceutical companies’ main weapon has been the First
Amendment, and the weapon landed a massive blow when the United States
Circuit Court for the Second Circuit ruled, in United States v. Caronia,11 that the
prosecution of a pharmaceutical sales representative for misbranding—
promoting a drug for unapproved uses—violated the First Amendment. The
court held that, while the First Amendment did not protect false or misleading
speech, “the government cannot prosecute the pharmaceutical manufacturers
and their representatives under the FDCA for speech promoting the lawful, offlabel use of an FDA-approved drug.”12 The opinion is striking because before it,
courts had generally considered misbranding prosecutions not to even implicate
the First Amendment.13
The decision, although from only one circuit court, seems to have chilled the
ability or willingness of the federal Food & Drug Administration (FDA) to
ensure that drug and device companies only promote their products for uses that
have proven to be safe and effective. Since the decision, the Department of
Justice has announced only three False Claims Act settlements involving
unlawful drug promotion—one against Shire Pharmaceuticals that mainly
settled claims relating to “false and misleading” promotion,14 another against
Genentech Inc. and OSI Pharmaceuticals LLC related to “misleading statements

9
H.R. 1703—Medical Product Communications Act of 2017, 115th Congress (2017–2018), available
at https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/1703/text.
10
Energy & Commerce Committee, Sub-Committee on Health, Hearing on Examining Medical Product
Manufacturer Communications, July 12, 2017, available at https://energycommerce.house.gov/hearings/
examining-medical-product-manufacturer-communications/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2018).
11
703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012).
12
703 F.3d at 169.
13
See, e.g., Whitaker v. Thompson, 353 F.3d 947 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
14
Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, Shire Pharmaceuticals LLC to Pay $56.5 Million to
Resolve False Claims Act Allegations Relating to Drug Marketing and Promotion Practices, Sept. 24, 2014,
available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/shire-pharmaceuticals-llc-pay-565-million-resolve-false-claimsact-allegations-relating-drug (last visited June 21, 2017). The FDA and the DOJ do appear to continue to be
willing to go after device companies and their sales representatives for off-label promotion, even where that
promotion is not patently false or misleading, likely because of the extra safety concerns involved with devices
that are implanted in patients. See Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, Former Acclarent, Inc.
Executives Convicted of Crimes Related to the Sale of Medical Devices, July 20, 2016, available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/former-acclarent-inc-executives-convicted-crimes-related-sale-medicaldevices (last visited June 22, 2017); Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, Johnson & Johnson
Subsidiary Acclarent Inc. Pays Government $18 Million to Settle False Claims Act Allegations, July 22, 2016,
available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/johnson-johnson-subsidiary-acclarent-inc-pays-government-18million-settle-false-claims-act (last visited June 22, 2017).
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about the effectiveness of the drug Tarceva,”15 and a third against Celgene for
marketing two cancer drugs for unapproved uses.16 Moreover, most recent
criminal prosecutions of pharmaceutical companies appear to be related to
promotion of drugs that have not been approved at all.17 While it may be that
pharmaceutical companies are engaging in less off-label promotion, the more
plausible explanation for the paucity in the past five years of FCA settlements
and prosecutions involving the off-label marketing of pharmaceuticals is the
Caronia decision.18
15
Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, Pharmaceutical Companies to Pay $67 Million to
Resolve False Claims Act Allegations Relating to Tarceva, June 6, 2016, available at https://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/pharmaceutical-companies-pay-67-million-resolve-false-claims-act-allegations-relating-tarceva
(last
visited June 21, 2017).
16
Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Central District of California, Celgene Agrees to Pay
$280 Million to Resolve Fraud Allegations Related to Promotion of Cancer Drugs For Uses Not Approved by
FDA, July 24, 2017, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/pr/celgene-agrees-pay-280-million-resolvefraud-allegations-related-promotion-cancer-drugs (last visited, Feb. 18, 2018). Notably, the Department of
Justice declined to intervene in this case, which was subsequently litigated by the relator who brought the case
and her counsel.
17
See, e.g., Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, District Court Enters Permanent Injunction
Against New Jersey Drug Manufacturer and Its President to Stop Distribution of Unapproved and Misbranded
Drugs, July 1, 2015, available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/district-court-enters-permanent-injunctionagainst-new-jersey-drug-manufacturer-and-its (last visited June 22, 2017) (discussing consent decree in case
regarding marketing of a prescription drug that had not received FDA approval for any use); Department of
Justice, Office of Public Affairs, United States Files Consent Decree of Permanent Injunction Against a
Louisiana Drug and Dietary Supplement Manufacturer to Stop Distribution of Misbranded and Unapproved
New Drugs and Misbranded and Adulterated Dietary Supplements, Feb. 16, 2017, available at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/united-states-files-consent-decree-permanent-injunction-against-louisianadrug-and-dietary (last visited June 22, 2017) (consent decree in case in which dietary supplements were marketed
as drugs without FDA approval); Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, District Court Enters
Permanent Injunction Against Colorado Companies to Stop Distribution of Adulterated And Misbranded
Dietary Supplements and Unapproved and Misbranded Drugs, Mar. 15, 2017, available at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/district-court-enters-permanent-injunction-against-colorado-companies-stopdistribution (last visited June 22, 2017) (same).
As to device companies, in April 2015, the DOJ filed charges against William Facteau and Patrick
Fabian, the CEO and Vice President of Sales, respectively, of Acclarent device company, for among other things,
misbranding, arising out of the promotion of a device approved as a sinus spacer for unapproved use as a delivery
device for steroids. See United States v. Facteau, 1:15-cr-10076-ADB, 2016 WL 4445741 (D. Mass. Aug. 22,
2016). On July 20, 2016, a jury convicted the men of 10 misdemeanor counts of introducing adulterated and
misbranded medical devices into interstate commerce. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, Former
Acclarent, Inc. Executives Convicted of Crimes Related to the Sale of Medical Devices, July 20, 2016, available
at https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/former-acclarent-inc-executives-convicted-crimes-related-sale-medicaldevices (last visited July 15, 2017). On July 22, 2016, the Department of Justice announced an $18 million False
Claims Act settlement with Johnson & Johnson, Acclarent’s parent, arising out of the same allegations.
Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, Johnson & Johnson Subsidiary Acclarent Inc. Pays Government
$18 Million to Settle False Claims Act Allegations, July 22, 2016, available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/
pr/johnson-johnson-subsidiary-acclarent-inc-pays-government-18-million-settle-false-claims-act (last visited
July 15, 2017).
18
Skadden, FDA Publications Double Down on Agency’s ability to Prohibit Off-Label Communications,
but Narrow Scope of Debate, Feb. 1, 2017, available at https://www.skadden.com/insights/
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Nevertheless, on the eve of the change in administrations, the FDA released
a Memorandum and two draft guidances on drug and device manufacturer
communications and opened a public comment period for the draft guidances.19
The Memorandum provides a robust defense of the FDCA and a strong rebuttal
to Caronia. While it is unclear what the current administration’s position will
be,20 this essay posits that the current laws, regulations, and rules that control the
marketing of drugs and devices for off-label use properly balance providing
physicians reliable information so that they soundly exercise their discretion to
assist their patients with protecting those patients from ineffective and
dangerous products. Moreover, the regulatory system currently in place does not
violate drug and device companies’ First Amendment rights. The FDA has
robust arguments for why Caronia was wrongly decided and the current system
strikes the right balance under the First Amendment. Further, the fact that the
FDA provides safe harbors to drug and device companies to provide information
about off-label uses of their products and the recent amendments made to the
FDCA by the 21st Century Cures Act, which broaden these safe harbors, show
that to the extent the FDCA constrains off-label marketing, such constraints are
narrowly tailored to effectuate the compelling need to protect the public from
harmful and ineffective drugs.
Thus, this essay posits that the FDA should protect the current regime put in
place by the Kefauver-Harris Amendments and continue to prosecute drug and
device companies and their employees for putting patient lives in danger by
marketing their products for off-label use. The essay focuses on the
pharmaceutical companies, but device companies are subject to the same
regulations. In fact, in 2015, the Department of Justice filed charges, including

publications/2017/02/fda-publications-double-down-on-agencys-ability-to (last checked June 22, 2017) (noting
the “perceived decrease in off-label enforcement actions” in the wake of Caronia).
19
See FDA, Memorandum, Public Health Interests and First Amendment Considerations Related to
Manufacturer Communications Regarding Unapproved Uses of Approved or Cleared Medical Products 3 (Jan.
2017), 82 F.R. 6367, 6367–68, available at https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2016-N-1149-0040
(last checked June 21, 2017) (hereinafter “FDA Memorandum”); FDA, Medical Product Communications That
Are Consistent with the FDA-Required Labeling—Questions and Answers, Guidance for Industry (Jan. 2017),
82 FR 6575, 6575–78 available at https://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatory
information/guidances/ucm537130.pdf (last visited July 5, 2017); FDA, Drug and Device Manufacturer
Communications With Payors, Formulary Committees, and Similar Entities-Questions and Answers; Draft
Guidance for Industry and Review Staff; Availability (Jan. 2017), 82 F.R. 6568, 6568–71.
20
Dr. Scott Gottlieb, the current head of the FDA, has “been an advocate for autonomy in the practice of
medicine and the use of medical products for off-label uses. He has opined that doctors are appropriately trained
to make medical decisions based on the best interest of their patients.” Anne K. Walsh, FDA, Under New
Leadership, Seeks More Comments on Rules Affecting Off-Label Communications, FDA Blog, May 18, 2017,
available at http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2017/05/fda-under-new-leadershipseeks-more-comments-on-rules-affecting-off-label-communications-.html (last visited July 5, 2017).
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claims for putting misbranded and adulterated products in interstate commerce,
against two Acclarent executives, William Facteau and Patrick Fabian, for the
promotion of a device approved as a sinus spacer for unapproved use as a steroid
delivery system.21 Facteau and Fabian were convicted of misdemeanor
misbranding and adulteration charges, and the case is still working its way
through the judicial system.22
In the meantime, as this essay makes clear, legislative efforts to allow
broader off-label marketing are short-sighted, ignoring both the terrible
consequences visited on patients prior to the Kefauver-Harris Amendments. The
current regime rightly allows the pharmaceutical and device companies to
provide reliable, accurate, and truthful information to physicians so that they can
make the best decisions possible for their patients, while ensuring that drugs and
devices are only marketed for uses for which they are scientifically proven to be
safe and effective.

I.

THE REGULATORY AND LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. The FDCA and Limits on Off-Label Marketing
The FDCA prohibits the “introduction or delivery for introduction into
interstate commerce any . . . drug [or] device . . . that is adulterated or
misbranded” and also prohibits “the adulteration or misbranding of any . . . drug
[or] device . . . in interstate commerce.”23 A drug or device is misbranded if,
among other things, its labeling does not bear “adequate directions for use,”24
which include directions that allow a layperson to use the drug safely “and for
the purposes for which it is intended.”25 The FDA considers the promotion of a
drug or device for a use other than one that has been approved by the FDA—
what is known as “off-label” promotion—to violate the misbranding
proscriptions because when a drug or device is promoted for an unapproved use,
the label contains no instructions about how to safely use the drug for the
unapproved use.

21

United States v. Facteau, 1:15-cr-10076-ADB, 2016 WL 4445741 (D. Mass. Aug. 22, 2016).
Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, Former Acclarent, Inc. Executives Convicted of Crimes
Related to the Sale of Medical Devices, July 20, 2016, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/formeracclarent-inc-executives-convicted-crimes-related-sale-medical-devices (last visited July 15, 2017).
23
21 U.S.C. § 331(a) & (b) (Dec. 13, 2016).
24
21 U.S.C. § 352(f).
25
21 C.F.R. § 201.5. Any person who violates these provisions is subject to imprisonment for not more
than one year, a $1,000 fine or both. 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(1).
22
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In order to market a drug for a specific use, a company must receive FDA
approval for the product for that use through the new drug application (NDA) or
supplemental new drug application (SNDA) process. Under this process, a
pharmaceutical company can only secure approval for a new use of a drug by
submitting an NDA or SNDA, which comprises a compilation of materials that
must include “full reports of [all clinical] investigations,”26 relevant nonclinical
studies, and “any other data or information relevant to an evaluation of the safety
and effectiveness of the drug product obtained or otherwise received by the
applicant from any source.”27 The NDA or SNDA must also include “the
labeling proposed to be used for such drug,”28 and “a discussion of why the
[drug’s] benefits exceed the risks [for the specified use] under the conditions
stated in the labeling.”29
The FDA may approve an NDA or SDNA only if it determines that the drug
in question is “safe for use” under “the conditions of use prescribed,
recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling thereof.”30 In order for the
FDA to consider a drug safe, the drug’s “probable therapeutic benefits must
outweigh its risk of harm”31 for its intended use. The NDA and SNDA process
ensures that drugs are marketed only for uses that have met the FDA’s
requirements of safety and effectiveness.32

26

21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(A).
21 C.F.R. §§ 314.50(d)(2) and (5)(iv); see Mutual Pharm. Co., Inc. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2470–
71 (2011) (explaining the FDA approval process).
28
21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(F); 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(c)(2)(i).
29
21 C.F.R. § 314.50(d)(5)(viii); § 314.50(c)(2)(ix).
30
21 U.S.C. § 355(d); Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2470.
31
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 140 (2000).
32
See FDA Memorandum, supra note 19, at 3 (“Despite the distinctions in the legal frameworks and
associated differences in premarket review pathways and processes, underlying them all are goals of spurring
innovation based on reliable scientific evidence of effectiveness and of ensuring the safety and effectiveness of
medical products for each intended use.”).
Devices are approved in a different manner, but also must meet the requirements of safety and
effectiveness to be marketed. The FDCA classifies medical devices in three categories: Classes I, I, and III. 21
U.S.C. § 360c(a). Class III devices include those that present a potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury.
Id. § 360c(a)(1)(C). Because of the risk associated with such devices, manufacturers of such devices must submit
premarket approval (“PMA”) applications to the FDA and obtain premarketing clearance before offering the
devices for sale 42 C.F.R. § 405.201(b). Class III devices that do not have PMA approval cannot be marketed
and are considered “adulterated.” 21 U.S.C. § 351(f)(1)(B); 42 C.F.R. § 405.201(b). In order to receive approval
through the PMA process, the drug company must provide sufficient valid scientific evidence to allow the FDA
to conclude that the device is safe and effective for its intended use. 21 C.F.R. § 814.2(a). “It is ‘a “rigorous”
process in which the manufacturer submits to the FDA extensive study reports, design specifications and
descriptions, samples of the device, and proposed labeling, and the FDA conducts a comprehensive review an
evaluation of all the submitted documents and materials [.]’” U.S. ex rel. Modglin v. DJO Glob. Inc., 48 F. Supp.
3d 1362, 1369 (C.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d sub nom. United States v. DJO Glob., Inc., 678 F. App’x 594 (9th Cir.
27
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In order to determine whether a drug is being marketed for a use for which
the drug (or a device) has not received an approved label, the FDA must rely
upon the marketing materials—the label, written disseminated materials, drug
representatives’ statements—to determine whether the “intended use” for which
the drug is being promoted is the use for which the company received approval
from the FDA or whether the drug is “misbranded.”
While the restrictions on “misbranding” prohibit pharmaceutical companies
from marketing a drug for which the FDA has not approved a label, they do not
prohibit physicians from prescribing a drug for a use not approved by the FDA.
The FDA has said:
Once a drug has been approved for marketing, a physician may
prescribe it for uses or in treatment regimens or patient populations
that are not included in approved labeling. Such “unapproved” or,
more precisely, “unlabeled” uses may be appropriate and rational in
certain circumstances, and may, in fact, reflect approaches to drug
therapy that have been extensively reported in medical literature. 33

But the FDA has expressed concern that “the public health is not well served”
when physicians’ judgments about what drugs to prescribe their patients “rest
on anecdotal experience or even preliminary scientific study,” since “too often,
the promise of safety and effectiveness made by such sources has not been
demonstrated when adequate and well-controlled clinical studies are
completed.”34
Thus, the FDA has sought to ensure that drug companies provide physicians
with scientifically accurate information about unapproved uses of their drugs. In
doing so, following the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of
1997, the FDA has issued a series of guidances that provide drug and device
companies with “safe harbors”—allowing them to disseminate scientifically
accurate information about unapproved uses of their products without fear of
prosecution.35 These safe harbors are quite broad and provide the companies
2017) (citing Kashani–Matts v. Medtronic, Inc., No. SACV 13-01161-CJC (RNBx), 2013 WL 6147032, *1
(C.D.Cal. Nov. 22, 2013)).
33
U.S. Food and Drug Admin., FDA Drug Bulletin, 12 FDA Drug Bull. 1, 5 (1982).
34
FDA, Guidance for Industry Distributing Scientific and Medical Publications on Unapproved Uses—
Recommended Practices 2 (Feb. 2014), available at https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/Guidance
ComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM387652.pdf (last visited July 5, 2017) (hereinafter “2014
Reprint Guidance”).
35
The Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296
(FDAMA) specifically authorizes manufacturers to disseminate “written information concerning the safety,
effectiveness, or benefit of a use not described in the approved labeling of a drug or device,” 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa
et seq., if it complied with certain requirements, including submitting an NDA for the drug. The current
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with a great deal of latitude to promote their products for uses that have not yet
met the FDA’s standards of safety and effectiveness. The two most important
guidances with respect to the safe harbors were published in 2009—before the
Caronia decision—and in 2014.36 The latter broadens even further the ways in
which pharmaceutical companies can market unapproved uses of their drugs.
The 2009 safe harbors guidance allows drug and device companies to
distribute scientific or medical journal articles about off-label uses that are
published by an organization “with an editorial board that uses experts who have
demonstrated expertise in the subject of the article under review by the
organization and who are independent of the organization”; are peer-reviewed
and published in accordance with the peer-review procedures of the
organization; and do not appear in the form of a special supplement or
publication that has been funded in whole or in part by one or more of the
manufacturers of the product that is the subject of the article.37 The 2009
Guidance makes clear that articles that are published by, or show undue
influence of, pharmaceutical or device companies—for example, they are
written or edited by a company or anyone who has received significant payments
from the company—do not fall within the safe harbor. The 2009 Guidance also
states that scientific and medical journal article reprints be provided in an
unabridged form; “contain information that describes and addresses adequate
and well-controlled clinical investigations that are considered scientifically
sound by experts with scientific training and experience to evaluate the safety or
effectiveness of the drug or device”; be disseminated with their approved
labeling and a comprehensive bibliography, when such information exists, of
other publications related to the off-label use of the drug, as well as a
representative publication, when such information exists, that reaches contrary
or different conclusions regarding the unapproved use.38 The 2014 Guidance,
which supersedes the 2009 Guidance, retains these same safe harbors and
requirements.

guidelines are even broader than this, because they allow dissemination of materials even for uses for which no
NDA has been submitted. FDA, Good Reprint Practices for the Distribution of Medical Journal Articles and
Medical or Scientific Reference Publications on Unapproved New Uses of Approved Drugs and Approved or
Cleared Medical Devices (Jan. 2009), available at https://www.fda.gov/regulatoryinformation/
guidances/ucm125126.htm (last visited July 5, 2017) (hereinafter “2009 Reprint Guidance”); 2014 Reprint
Guidance, supra note 34. According to these guidances, “if manufacturers distribute scientific or medical
publications as recommended in this guidance, FDA does not intend to use such distribution as evidence of the
manufacturer’s intent that the produce be used for an unproved new use.” Id. at 6.
36
2009 Reprint Guidance, supra note 35; 2014 Reprint Guidance, supra note 34.
37
2009 Reprint Guidance, supra note 35.
38
2009 Reprint Guidance, supra note 35; 2014 Reprint Guidance, supra note 34, at 7–8.
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Notably, the pharmaceutical industry does not seem to believe that these
requirements are inappropriate. In a document entitled “Principles on
Responsible Sharing of Truthful and Non-Misleading Information About
Medicines with Health Care Professionals and Payers,” BIO, the biotechnology
trade association, and PhRMA, the pharmaceutical industry group, noted that in
distributing a reprint involving the off-label use of a drug, in order to
“communicate information about the content of the reprint . . . in a truthful and
non-misleading manner” the company should disclose, among other things:
(a) accurate and balanced information about the approved product
labeling (including the indication, limitations of use, efficacy and
safety data described therein); (b) the type of research that is the
subject of the reprint (including the study design, method of
analysis, and appropriate, context-specific disclosures regarding
the limitations with retrospective meta-analysis); (c) the results
reported in the reprint, including the statistical significance and
confidence intervals of each result; and (d) other relevant evidence
that is necessary to an informed medical judgment, including peerreviewed contrary evidence.39
The FDA’s 2014 Guidance also further broadens the information about offlabel uses that pharmaceutical companies can provide to physicians. It allows
pharmaceutical companies to distribute scientific and medical reference texts
and clinical practice guidelines without fear of prosecution. Like the 2009
Guidance, the 2014 Guidance places some reasonable limits on the distribution
of this information to ensure that it is scientifically reliable, accurate, and is not
misleading.40 Thus, although the FDA generally considers off-label use of a drug
“misbranding,” the safe harbors give the pharmaceutical and device companies
significant leeway to provide unbiased, evidence-based, medically and
scientifically accurate information to physicians about unapproved uses of their
products.

39
BIO & PhRMA, Principles on Responsible Sharing of Truthful and Non-Misleading Information About
Medicines with Health Care Professionals and Payers 10 (July 27, 2016), available at https://www.bio.
org/sites/default/files/PrinciplesReport_FINAL.pdf (last visited July 5, 2017). BIO and PhRMA’s only apparent
quibble with the reprint guidelines is the prohibition on the distribution of studies funded by the pharmaceutical
industry.
40
For example, dissemination of reference texts is limited to texts that are, among other things, based on
a systematic review of the existing evidence, are published by an independent publisher, represent the most
current version of the text, and are peer-reviewed by experts. 2014 Reprint Guidance, supra note 34, at 11.
Dissemination of Clinical Practice Guidelines is limited to a CPG that is, among other things, based on a
systematic review of the existing evidence, is developed by a knowledgeable, multidisciplinary panel of experts
and representatives from key affected groups, and be based on “an explicit and transparent process by which the
CPG is developed and funded that minimizes distortions, biases, and conflicts of interest.” Id. at 14–15.
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The 21st Century Cures Act, passed and signed into legislation in December
2016, further broadens the scope of manufacturers’ ability to promote off-label
uses of their products. Specifically, Section 3037 of the Act amends the FDCA
to allow pharmaceutical manufacturers to provide health care economic data to
certain entities related to an unapproved use of a drug. The Act also requires the
FDA to conduct public meetings and issue guidance within 18 months (by mid2019) addressing changes to clinical trial designs and the use of real world
evidence to help support approval of new indications for an approved drug. In
other words, the 21st Century Cures Act allows drug manufacturers to provide
a specific category of off-label information to certain entities and encourages the
FDA to make the approval of new uses of already approved drugs easier and
cheaper. The safe harbors and the promise of an easier path to approvals for new
uses shows that any restrictions on speech that may be the by-product of
misbranding prosecutions are “limited and targeted” and reasonably fit the
FDA’s substantial interest in ensuring the unfortunate consequences wrought by
the unlimited marketing of drugs in the 1950s and 1960s do not recur.41

B. Pharmaceutical Marketing and the First Amendment
Since the 1970s, the Supreme Court has had occasion to consider whether
limits on pharmaceutical marketing violate the First Amendment, although it has
never directly considered whether prosecutions for misbranding implicate or
violate the First Amendment. The opinions with respect to other forms of
pharmaceutical marketing acknowledge that some commercial information is
protected by the First Amendment, but the protection is not categorical. Instead,
the Court generally balances the government’s substantial interest in restricting
speech with the public interest in the free flow of information. The Court in these
cases has tended to acknowledge the government’s “substantial interests,” but
has also often characterized them as “paternalistic.” The Court has also tended
to ignore whether the information that is being provided really gives the intended
audience the complete information it needs to engage in rational decisionmaking; instead the assumption is usually that more information, of whatever
quality, helps inform the economic decisionmaker. In other words, more
information equals more truth. The dissents in these cases—two authored by
Justice Breyer—take issue with the Court substituting its own judgment for that
of more expert and democratic legislatures and agencies.
41
See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 168 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding that the government has not
established a “‘reasonable fit’ among its interests in drug safety and public health, the lawfulness of off-label
use, and its construction of the FDCA to prohibit off-label promotion” and suggesting “the government’s
interests could be served equally well by more limited and targeted restrictions on speech.”)
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In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc.,42 the first of these cases, the Court ruled that a state law prohibiting
pharmacists from posting drug prices violated the First Amendment. The Court
found, for the first time, that commercial speech was protected by the First
Amendment.43 It then ruled that the ban on posting drug prices was
unconstitutional because it prohibited the free flow of information to consumers.
The Court held: “So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise
economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure will be made through
numerous private economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those
decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the
free flow of commercial information is indispensable.”44 The Court considered
the benefits of the ban, but rejected those as being “highly paternalistic.”45 The
Court was particularly concerned that the “State’s protectiveness of its citizens
rests in large measure on the advantages of their being kept in ignorance.”46 It
emphasized the importance of the free flow of information and having a
“marketplace of ideas” that allows individual citizens to make proper
decisions—whether political or economic—lies at the heart of the First
Amendment’s protections.
In a dissent, Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that the free flow of
information is important, but noted that when it comes to commercial
information, that concern should be for the legislature, which can more properly
balance the need for the free flow of information against other concerns.47 More
specifically, Justice Rehnquist did not believe it appropriate for the Court to
impose an “open door policy” towards commercial advertising related to
pharmaceuticals because on the one hand, he felt that an individual’s interest in
commercial information is relatively low because it affects economic decisions,
not political or social ones, while on the other hand, “the societal interest against
the promotion of drug use for every ill, real or imaginary, seems . . . extremely
strong.”48 He argued, therefore, that balancing these concerns was better left to
the legislature than to the court.
In Thompson v. Western States, a group of compounding pharmacists
challenged a provision of the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act

42
43
44
45
46
47
48

425 U.S. 748 (1976).
Id. at 770.
Id. at 765.
Id. at 770.
Id. at 769.
Id. at 784 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 790.
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of 1997 that exempted providers of compound drugs from the FDA’s drug
approval requirements so long as they abided by several restrictions, including,
for the purposes of the lawsuit, a prohibition on advertising or promoting the
compounding of any particular drug, class of drug, or type of drug.49 The parties
agreed that the prohibition involved commercial speech. Thus, in deciding
whether the advertising prohibition violated the First Amendment, the Court
applied the commercial speech test set out in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp.
v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N.Y.50 Under the Central Hudson test, the Court first
determines whether the commercial speech that is banned concerns unlawful
activity or is false or misleading.51 If so, it can be prohibited. If not, the Court
applies a three-part test. First, it asks whether the asserted governmental interest
that prohibits or curtails the commercial speech is “substantial.”52 If it is, the
Court then asks whether “the regulation directly advances the governmental
interest asserted.”53 The Court then analyzes whether there is a reasonable fit
between the governmental interest and the curtailment of speech, looking at
whether the regulation “is not more extensive than is necessary to serve the
interest.”54
In analyzing whether the advertising prohibition violated the First
Amendment, the Court gave credit to the government’s stated substantial
interests. Specifically, the Court held that “[p]reserving the effectiveness and
integrity of the FDCA’s new drug approval process is clearly an important
governmental interest, and the Government has every reason to want as many
drugs as possible to be subject to that approval process.”55 The Court also
recognized that the government has to be able to draw the line between smallscale compounding and large-scale drug manufacturing.56 But the Court found
problematic the use of advertising as a proxy for whether a compounding
pharmacy was engaged in large-scale advertising. The Court noted that there
were several other non-speech-related means of drawing a line between
compounding and large-scale manufacturing, including prohibiting pharmacists
from compounding drugs without a prescription, from selling products at
wholesale to commercial entities, or limiting the number of prescriptions a
compounding pharmacy could fill. Thus, the Court held that the speech
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

535 U.S. 357, 364–65 (2002).
447 U.S. 557 (1980).
535 U.S. at 367 (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 369.
Id. at 370.
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restrictions were more extensive than necessary to serve the government’s
interest in distinguishing between small- and large-scale drug manufacturers.57
The Court rejected the notion that one of the important government interests
served by the prohibition was protecting the health and safety of the public by
ensuring compounding drugs were not sold to patients who do not clearly need
them because while the dissent suggested this interest, the Government itself did
not.58 The Court noted that the Central Hudson test is not a rational basis test—
which allows the Court to uphold the regulation if any rational basis for the
regulation can be articulated—but rather applies a heightened level of scrutiny
requiring the government to articulate an important interest advanced by the
regulation.59 The Court also stated that even if it were to assume that protecting
consumers was an interest advanced by the advertising prohibition, it could not
accept it as important, since the concern “amounts to a fear that people would
make bad decisions if given truthful information about compounded drugs,”
which is “paternalistic” and therefore inappropriate.60
Following Rehnquist’s dissent in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, Justice
Breyer, in a dissent in Western States, admonished the majority for substituting
its own judgment for that of the legislature. Justice Breyer opined that the
statutory history showed that one of the important interests served by the
advertising prohibition was to protect the public health and safety by ensuring
that patients get the individualized therapy they actually need. The restrictions,
he noted, “diminish the likelihood that those who do not genuinely need untested
compound drugs will not receive them.”61 Justice Breyer criticized the
majority’s unwillingness to seriously credit these interests and its willingness,
instead, to “too readily assume[] the existence of practical alternatives.”62 He
stated his concern that the test imposed by the Court was too strict and
transformed “what ought to be a legislative or regulatory decision about the best
way to protect the health and safety of the American public into a constitutional
decision prohibiting the legislature from enacting necessary protections.”63
The most recent of the Court’s decisions involving pharmaceutical
marketing and the First Amendment is Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,64 which held
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

Id. at 371–72.
Id. at 373.
Id. at 374.
Id. at 374–75 (citing Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770).
Id. at 382 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 388.
Id. 389.
564 U.S. 552 (2011).
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that a Vermont law that prohibited pharmacy records that show the prescribing
habits of doctors to be sold to pharmaceutical companies or used for marketing
violated the First Amendment. While the law did not restrict speech, the majority
opinion characterized it as enacting “content- and speaker-based restrictions on
the sale, disclosure, and use of prescriber-identifying information.”65 Because it
disfavored marketing—a form of speech—the majority stated it was appropriate
to apply “heightened judicial scrutiny” to the law.66 The Court then applied the
Central Hudson standard to the law, first considering the state’s interest in the
law.
Vermont contended that the law was necessary to “protect medical privacy,
including physician confidentiality, avoidance of harassment, and the integrity
of the doctor-patient relationship” and that it also led to “improved public health
and reduced healthcare costs.”67 The majority indicated that such purposes were
“proper,” but ultimately concluded that they did not provide sufficient
justification for the law.68 Since the majority essentially found that the State’s
interests were not substantial or permissibly furthered by the law, the Court did
not reach any of the other Central Hudson factors.
As to Vermont’s justifications for the law, the Court held that with respect
to protecting physicians from harassment, pharmaceutical marketing constituted
“benign and, many would say, beneficial speech” and “fear that speech might
persuade provides no lawful basis for quieting it.”69 The Court noted that
detailing by pharmaceutical sales reps could be “instructive” and selectively
pointed to the record, which showed “some Vermont doctors view targeted
detailing based on prescriber-identifying information as ‘very helpful’ because
it allows detailers to shape their messages to each doctor’s practice.”70 The Court
also credited the testimony of a Vermont physician who said “information is
power. And the more you know, or anyone knows, the better decisions can be
made.”71 Indeed, the Court noted that the law’s concern over the adverse effects
of pharmaceutical marketing to doctors could be characterized as a fear that the
Court routinely has held not to be a permissible basis to infringe upon the First
Amendment: the “fear that people would make bad decisions if given truthful

65
66
67
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Id. at 563–64.
Id. at 565.
Id. at 572.
Id. at 577.
Id. at 576.
Id. at 578.
Id.
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information.”72 On this point, the Court stated that it should be particularly
skeptical of regulations “that seek to keep people in the dark for what the
government perceives to be their own good” and that such “precepts apply with
full force when the audience, in this case prescribing physicians, consists of
‘sophisticated and experienced’ consumers.”73 In other words, the Court would
not let “paternalism” get in the way of allowing pharmaceutical marketers to
target and harass physicians based on their prescribing habits. Instead, in line
with its conviction that more information is always better, the Court noted that
the way for the State to combat its concerns would be to express its view “that
detailers who use prescriber-identifying information are effective in promoting
brand-name drugs” through “its own speech.”74
In a dissent, Justice Breyer decried the majority’s use of heightened scrutiny
in the case, characterizing the law not as a content- and speaker-based
proscription on information—the law “neither forbids nor requires anyone to say
anything”75—but rather as prohibiting certain entities from accessing
information collected pursuant to a State regulatory scheme. Justice Breyer also
found that the law met the Central Hudson factors. First, he held that the
protection of public health is a substantial interest that falls within the traditional
scope of the State’s police powers and that the law advanced these interests.
Justice Breyer cited to the “substantial legislative record” that showed data
mining allowed drug companies to manipulate their messages to physicians, so
that physicians would not necessarily get “fair and balanced” information.76
Thus, Justice Breyer credited the parts of the record that showed that “more
information” does not necessarily equal “more truth.” Justice Breyer also found
that the law was narrowly tailored to meet its objectives. He criticized the
majority for not being able to point to “any adequately supported, similarly
effective ‘more limited restriction,’”77 and discredited the respondents’
suggestion that pharmaceutical company manipulation could be combatted with
more speech from the State (letting doctors know their prescribing information
is being used, “educating” doctors about generics). Justice Breyer noted that
such informative programs have “been in effect for some time in Vermont or
other States, without indication that they have prevented the imbalanced sales

72

Id. at 577.
Id. (citing 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996) and Edenfield v. Fane, 507
U.S. 761, 775 (1993)).
74
Id. at 578.
75
Id. at 585.
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Id. at 597–98.
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Id. at 599.
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tactics at which Vermont’s statute takes aim.”78 Ultimately, Justice Breyer
opined, as he did in Western States, that courts ought to defer “significantly to
legislative judgment” when reviewing regulatory legislation that indirectly
affects speech.79

C. United States v. Caronia80
Although pharmacists and pharmaceutical companies had been victorious in
using the First Amendment as a shield against regulation in the Supreme Court,
until 2012, no one had suggested that the FDCA’s entire regulatory scheme—
requiring approval for a drug use before a company can promote it—was
unconstitutional. Indeed, in his dissent in IMS Health, Justice Breyer stated
(perhaps presciently), that “[n]o one has yet suggested that substantial portions
of federal drug regulation are unconstitutional.”81 But in Caronia, the Second
Circuit, relying mainly on IMS Health, held that misbranding prosecutions
violate the First Amendment, striking a blow to the FDA’s entire drug (and
device) approval process.
In the case, the United States had prosecuted Alfred Caronia, a
pharmaceutical sales representative, for violating the FDCA’s misbranding
provisions by promoting Xyrem, which the FDA approved to treat narcolepsy in
patients with cataplexy and patients with excessive daytime sleepiness, by
promoting the drug for insomnia, fibromyalgia, periodic leg movement, restless
leg syndrome, and Parkinson’s disease, among other things. Caronia also
promoted Xyrem for patients under the age of 16, a population for which it had
not received FDA approval. Notably, because of its very serious adverse side
effects, the FDA required Xyrem’s manufacturer, Orphan Medical (now Jazz
Pharmaceutical), to place a black box warning on the label. At trial, the
government relied on Caronia’s statements to the physicians to show that he
“misbranded” the drugs, meaning that he allowed Xyrem to be used without
labeling bearing “adequate directions for use,”82 because he intended that it be
used for purposes other than those contained in the FDA-approved label. Caronia
was convicted of misbranding, and he challenged his conviction as violating the
First Amendment.

78
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Id. at 600–01.
Id. at 584.
703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012).
564 U.S. at 598.
21 U.S.C. § 352(f).
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The government argued that its prosecution of Caronia had no First
Amendment implications because it was not prosecuting Caronia for his speech;
instead, it used his speech as evidence of the “intended use” of Xyrem. The
Second Circuit summarily dismissed this argument, contending that “the
government’s theory of prosecution identified Caronia’s speech alone as the
proscribed conduct.”83 Concluding, then, that the prosecution of Caronia for
misbranding implicated the First Amendment, the Second Circuit turned to the
Central Hudson analysis.
Under the first prong of Central Hudson, the court determined whether the
effect of the misbranding prosecution—disallowing off-label speech—
concerned unlawful activity or false or misleading statements. Again, without
any analysis, the court noted that “the promotion of off-label drug use is not in
and of itself false or misleading.”84 The court then went on to consider whether
the government had a substantial interest that was directly advanced by the
prosecution. The government asserted that its interest was “preserving the
effectiveness and integrity of the FDCA’s drug approval process, and an interest
in reducing patient exposure to unsafe and ineffective drugs.”85 In considering
whether this interest was substantial and advanced by the regulation, the court
did not consider the legislative history of the Kefauver-Harris amendments at
all. Instead, it concluded that because physicians were allowed to prescribe drugs
off-label, “prohibiting the truthful promotion of off-label drug usage by a
particular class of speakers would [not] directly further the government’s goals
of preserving the efficacy and integrity of the FDA’s drug approval process and
reducing patient exposure to unsafe and ineffective drugs.”86 Following Sorrell,
the court also essentially accepted that more information equals more truth,
opining that prohibiting off-label promotion “‘paternalistically’ interferes with
the ability of physicians and patients to receive potentially relevant treatment
information.”87
The Caronia court also concluded that the government’s construction of the
misbranding regulation to prohibit off-label promotion was not narrowly drawn
to achieve its purpose. Ignoring the safe harbors, which even in 2011 gave
substantial leeway to drug companies to provide reprints and other reliable
information about off-label uses to physicians, the court instead offered up its
own apparently more narrowly drawn regulatory suggestions as solutions to the
83
84
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problem of off-label promotion. The court suggested that “the government could
[put] ceilings or caps on off-label prescriptions”; could “remind physicians and
manufacturers of, and even perhaps further regulate, the legal ability
surrounding off-label promotion and treatment decisions”; or “where [the] offlabel drug use is exceptionally concerning . . . could prohibit the off-label use
altogether.”88 In response to the government’s assertion that these suggestions
were not “feasible,” the court remarkably concluded that such an assertion was
“conclusory” and that the government—which of course during the democratic
legislative process and with input from regulatory experts had considered many
options and come up with the regulatory scheme currently in place—had to
demonstrate that the “proposed alternatives”—thrown out in briefs by
pharmaceutical companies and their supporters—“are less effective than its
construction of the FDCA in furthering the government interests identified.”89
In a scathing dissent, Judge Livingston criticized the majority’s finding that
the misbranding prosecution implicated the First Amendment and also asserted
that, even assuming it did, all the Central Hudson factors were met. First, Judge
Livingston pointed out that Caronia was not prosecuted for off-label promotion,
but for misbranding. His statements about the off-label uses of Xyrem were
entered as evidence of intent, and the Supreme Court has held—in a hate crimes
case—that the “First Amendment . . . does not prohibit the evidentiary use of
speech to establish the elements of a crime or to prove motive or intent.”90 Thus,
Judge Livingston asserted, “[c]onsistent with the First Amendment . . . otherwise
permissible conduct may become impermissible if undertaken with a prohibited
motive, and speech may be used as evidence of such a motive. An employer, for
example, is generally free to refuse to promote an employee simply because he
does not like the employee’s attitude, but he may not refuse to promote the
employee because of her sex. . . . The First Amendment does not bar using the
employer’s speech to demonstrate his discriminatory motive.”91 Thus, under
Judge Livingston’s analysis, the prosecution of Caronia did not even raise First
Amendment concerns.
Nevertheless, Judge Livingston addressed whether, assuming that using
Caronia’s speech as evidence of his intent was not necessarily constitutionally
permissible, it met the requirements of Central Hudson and Sorrell and found
that it met the scrutiny required by those cases.92 Judge Livingston noted that
88
89
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Id. at 168.
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Id. at 171 (citing Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993)).
Id. at 175 (internal citations omitted).
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without the ability to prosecute drug companies and their employees for
misbranding, the FDA would be unable to encourage participation in the drug
approval process. After all, “[i]f drug manufacturers were allowed to promote
FDA-approved drugs for non-approved uses, they would have little incentive to
seek FDA approval for those uses.”93 Thus, the ability to prosecute drug
companies for misbranding when they promote drugs for off-label uses is
essential to the entire scheme of drug approvals, the very scheme that the
Supreme Court found to be “clearly an important governmental interest” in
Western States.94
Judge Livingston found this scheme to be narrowly tailored to its objectives.
She pointed to the fact that the prohibition on off-label promotion is limited to
drug manufacturers, rather than all speakers, as evidence that the statute is
narrowly drawn, since it targets “the precise group that the government must
encourage to participate in the new drug approval process.”95 And she noted that
the prohibition on off-label promotion is thus not simply an act of paternalism
“meant to shield physicians and patients from truthful information.”96 Instead,
“it is a necessary tool for the effective functioning of a regulatory system that
the Supreme Court has endorsed as legitimate.”97 Judge Livingston also asserted
that the alternatives that the majority asserted as being less restrictive ways of
advancing the government’s interests were not as effective, and with respect to
a total ban on off-label promotion, more concerning under the First
Amendment.98 Ultimately, Judge Livingston concluded that the system of drug
regulation that allows prosecution for misbranding for off-label promotion of a
drug was constitutional under Central Hudson and Sorrell:
Our system of drug regulation developed to protect consumers from
misleading and unsubstantiated claims about drugs’ safety and
efficacy, and the prohibition on off-label promotion by drug
manufacturers is essential to maintaining the effectiveness of that
system. Therefore, even if such a prohibition is considered a direct
regulation of speech, it is a regulation that directly advances a
substantial government interest in a manner not more extensive than
necessary to serve that interest.99
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II. ATTACKING CARONIA
Caronia was wrongly decided for many reasons, including those laid out by
Judge Livingston. There is a strong argument that misbranding prosecutions,
which rely on off-label statements to show intent, do not even implicate the First
Amendment because they seek to punish conduct, not speech. The D.C. Circuit
had already held as much prior to Caronia, and even after Caronia, the Seventh
Circuit in an unpublished decision in United States v. LeBeau100 held that a
misbranding prosecution did not raise First Amendment concerns.
The Caronia majority opinion also arguably failed to properly analyze the
Central Hudson factors. Namely, the majority opinion assumed, without further
inquiry, that promotional speech about off-label indications is truthful, when, in
fact, it differs substantially from the previous types of commercial speech
protected by the Supreme Court in its ability to be verified, and therefore to
mislead. First Amendment commercial speech restrictions make clear that “false
and misleading” information does not receive First Amendment protection. Of
course, what the FDA’s regulatory regime ensures is that the information drug
companies provide to physicians about off-label uses is not misleading—that it
is fully truthful. Thus, to the extent that pharmaceutical companies and their
employees provide information outside of the safe harbors, the information they
provide is inherently misleading, and does not deserve First Amendment
protection. The Caronia court therefore erred in assuming that the information
Caronia provided to his physicians was neither false nor misleading.
The majority opinion also did not give enough weight to the substantial
interest furthered by the FDA’s regulatory regime and wrongly substituted its
own judgment as to what policies would be more narrowly tailored to further
those interests. The FDA’s January 2017 memorandum goes a long way to
bolstering these arguments. Moreover, the broadening of the safe harbors in the
FDA’s 2014 guidance—released two years after Caronia—and amendments to
the FDCA made by the 21st Century Cures Act give the FDA even more evidence
to show that its regime in fact properly balances the need to protect the public
from unsafe and ineffective drugs with the ability of the pharmaceutical
companies to provide accurate, reliable, and fully truthful information about offlabel uses of their products to the physicians who can write prescriptions for
those products, and thus is as least restrictive as possible.

100

654 Fed. App’x 826 (7th Cir. 2016).
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Given the weaknesses in the Caronia court’s reasoning, the strong
arguments the FDA has, and the fact that at least one other Circuit Court has
found a misbranding prosecution not to implicate the First Amendment—albeit
in an unpublished opinion—the FDA should not be concerned about, as
Kesselheim and Mello, “taking another run”101 at Caronia and continuing to
protect the public by aggressively prosecuting misbranding cases when drug and
device companies promote their products for unapproved uses.

A. Speech May Be Used as Evidence of Intent in Misbranding Cases
As Judge Livingston pointed out in her dissent, a prosecution for
misbranding involves showing that a drug company or its employee promoted a
drug for a use different from a use that the company intended be approved by
the FDA. In order to provide evidence that the drug company put the drug in the
stream of commerce without a sufficient label for the use, it must show what use
the company or employee intended. Of course, the only way to prove such use
is to put into evidence the written or oral statements of the company or its
employee. FDA regulations make clear that for the purposes of making out a
misbranding claim, the intended use of a drug is determined by taking into
account “the objective intent of the persons legally responsible for the labeling
of the drugs.”102 “Objective intent” may be shown through “oral or written
statements by such persons or their representatives.”103
In holding that the utilization of such evidence violated the First
Amendment, the Caronia decision ignored Supreme Court precedent and put at
risk a whole host of laws that regulate conduct in which intent makes all the
difference. As Judge Livingston noted, the difference between a permissible
employment termination and an impermissible one is intent.104 And since no one
can get into the head of any person, evidence of that intent is likely to come in
written or spoken form. This is also true for hate crime legislation. In that
context, the Supreme Court has been clear that use of speech to show that a crime
was motivated by racial animus does not raise First Amendment concerns.
In Wisconsin v. Mitchell,105 the Supreme Court considered whether a
criminal penalty enhancement for hate crimes violated the First Amendment.

101
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Mitchell, who was African-American, was convicted of aggravated battery for
beating a white boy. Prior to the beating, Mitchell asked the group of young men
who assisted him in the beating, “Do you all feel hyped up to move on some
white people?”106 Mitchell claimed that the penalty enhancement violated the
First Amendment because it would chill speech. The Court rejected his
argument, holding that the First Amendment “does not prohibit the evidentiary
use of speech to establish the elements of a crime or to prove motive or intent.”107
In 2004, the D.C. Circuit applied this reasoning in a pharmaceutical
marketing case. In Whitaker v. Thompson,108 Whitaker sought to market saw
palmetto—an extract from the pulp of the dwarf American palm—as a dietary
supplement to “improve urine flow, reduce nocturnia and reduce voiding
urgency associated with mild benign prostatic hyperplasia (BPH).”109 The FDA
denied his petition, finding that he was not intending to market saw palmetto as
a dietary supplement, but instead was making “drug claims.” Thus, saw palmetto
could not be marketed to treat BPH without being approved as a drug. Whitaker
sued, arguing that the FDA’s refusal to allow him to market saw palmetto using
his proposed label violated the First Amendment’s protections for commercial
speech. The court rejected his argument, noting that at issue was whether
Whitaker intended to market the saw palmetto as a dietary supplement or a drug.
Since his speech was integral to divining intent and thereby the proposed uses
of the product, the FDA’s reliance on it did not violate the First Amendment.
Specifically, the court held, relying on Mitchell, that “it is constitutionally
permissible for the FDA to use speech, in the form of labeling, to infer intent for
purposes of determining” whether the proposed sale of the product “would
constitute the forbidden sale of an unapproved drug.”110
Even after Caronia, the Seventh Circuit has recognized that it is
constitutionally permissible for speech to be used as evidence to show the
intended uses of a product. In United States v. LeBeau,111 LeBeau was convicted
106

Id. at 480.
Id. at 489.
108
353 F.3d 947 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
109
Id. at 948.
110
Id. at 953; see also Holistic Candlers & Cons. Ass’n v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 770 F. Supp. 156,
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communications made by the accused in furtherance of the illegal agreement or scheme to defraud,” thus the
indictment seeks to punish defendant “not for his speech, but for the underlying crime evidenced by that
speech.”).
111
654 Fed. App’x 826 (7th Cir. 2016).
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under the misbranding provisions for introducing into interstate commerce four
products that he claimed would treat certain allergies and diseases, without
gaining FDA approval for the drugs. Mr. LeBeau had advertised that these four
products could “mitigate certain food allergies, Lyme disease, colds, influenza,
and H1N1 flu.”112 He pled guilty, but reserved his right to challenge, among
other things, the constitutionality of the misbranding provisions.113 He argued
that the provisions violated his First Amendment right to commercial speech by
limiting his ability to make truthful claims about his product. The Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected LeBeau’s claims, recognizing that the
statements LeBeau made about the efficacy of his products to treat certain
conditions constituted evidence to show how LeBeau intended consumers to use
the products, and thus whether the products were “drugs” under 21 U.S.C.
§ 321(g)(1). Thus, LeBeau was not prosecuted for his speech, but for his acts—
“his attempt to profit from the sale of a product—which he represented to have
palliative properties—without having received approval to do so.”114 The Court
recognized, citing Mitchell and Whitaker, that it is constitutionally permissible
to use speech as evidence to establish the elements of a crime.115
Likewise, in Caronia, the government was not prosecuting Caronia for his
speech, but rather for promoting Xyrem for uses for which Orphan did not have
FDA approval. The majority summarily rejected this argument, finding
categorically that “the government has treated promotional speech as more than
merely evidence of a drug’s intended use—it has construed the FDCA to prohibit
promotional speech as misbranding itself.”116 But this makes no sense. How else
is the government supposed to prove whether a drug company or its employee
intended physicians to use a product in a manner for which the company has not
received approval? It can only rely on the statements made or the information
provided to those physicians.
“Misbranding” is putting a drug into the stream of interstate commerce
without adequate labeling. The only way to know whether or not the labeling is
“adequate” is to understand what use the person or entity that put it into the
stream of commerce intended for it. This is because directions are only adequate
if they include, for example, “[s]tatements of all . . . uses for which such drug is
intended,” and “usual quantities [of dose] for each of the uses for which it is
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intended.”117 And so in Caronia, the only way to prove what “use” the drug was
being provided for and whether its labeling was adequate for that use was to
discuss and put into evidence Caronia’s promotional statements. But the
government was prosecuting Caronia for an act—for conduct—not speech.
Certainly, in a discrimination case or even a hate crime case, the act and the
statements that show intention may have more light between them. In a
discriminatory termination case, you have the conduct—the termination—and
then the question of whether or not it was permissible. In a hate crime case, you
have the crime—the conduct—and then the question of whether it was motivated
by racial animus. In a misbranding case where the drug has already been
approved and therefore is already in the stream of commerce, the act and the
intention are more closely tied because the actual communications can be
construed as misbranding.
When Caronia made statements about the off-label use of Xyrem, the
problem was that he was allowing the drug to be put into the stream of commerce
for a use for which it was not approved. But because in a misbranding case
involving a drug that has already been approved, the drug is already in the stream
of commerce, there is no separate physical act that is easily disconnected from
the statements that show intent. Thus, the statements themselves seem to be the
target of the prosecution. In Whitaker and LeBeau the separation between the act
and the statements showing intent was clearer, because in those cases the
defendants were accused of putting a drug into the stream of commerce that had
never been approved. But because the FDA requires a supplemental new drug
application when a product considered a “drug” is put on the market for a
specific use, regardless of whether it has previously been approved for another
use, there is no difference between these prosecutions except that it is harder to
see the conduct as separate from the speech in a case involving an already
approved drug. Nevertheless, even in cases involving the off-label promotion of
an already approved drug, the statements themselves are not the subject of the
prosecution, even though those statements and the impermissible act are
arguably more closely tied and more capable of confusion, than, say, a beating—
which is a clearly physical act—and the words that explain the motive for that
beating.
Given the lack of easily recognizable, maybe even physical, conduct in a
misbranding case involving a drug that has already been approved for use, it is
easy to see why a court may consider the off-label communication itself as
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misbranding and therefore find that the prosecution involves speech itself.
However, this view—the one taken by the majority in Caronia—has no basis in
the statute and regulations under which Caronia was prosecuted. Instead, the use
of statements to show the “intended use” of a product in a misbranding
prosecution is constitutionally permissible under Mitchell. The FDA has a strong
argument to continue to take this position in misbranding prosecutions.

B. Prosecutions for Misbranding Involving the Promotion of an Approved
Drug for an Unapproved Use Meet the Central Hudson Factors
1. Off-Label Promotion Is Inherently Misleading
Even assuming that misbranding prosecutions involve speech, there are also
compelling arguments for why they constitute a constitutionally acceptable
restraint on speech. As explained above, the analysis of whether commercial
speech meets First Amendment strictures is governed by the factors set forth in
Central Hudson. When applying the Central Hudson test, a court first
determines whether the commercial speech that is banned concerns unlawful
activity or is false or misleading.118 The Caronia court did not engage in an indepth analysis of this element, assuming that “promoting off-label drug use
concerns lawful activity (off-label drug use), and the promotion of off-label drug
use is not in and of itself false or misleading.”119 But this is not an inevitable
conclusion. The Supreme Court held in Central Hudson that communications
can be “misleading” and therefore permissibly prohibited if they are “more
likely to deceive the public than inform it.”120 In Friedman v. Rogers, the Court
held that Texas’ prohibition on optometrists’ use of trade names did not violate
the First Amendment because trade names could be misleading. The Court noted
that the trade names did not have to be misleading in order to be regulated.
Rather, trade names could properly be regulated because they facilitate “largescale commercialization which enhances the opportunity for misleading
practices.”121 In Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, the Court recognized that
commercial speech can be regulated, especially if it is deceptive or
misleading.122 The Court noted that it would not violate the First Amendment to
ensure that commercial information “flow cleanly as well as freely.”123
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Off-label promotion falls into the category of commercial speech that is
highly likely to be misleading. In general, a specific piece of information about
an unapproved use of a product may not be misleading, but when physicians are
given incomplete information about an unapproved use, it certainly can be said
to be “more likely to deceive” physicians than inform them. Indeed, many
observers have noted that off-label promotion is inherently misleading, and is
certainly so when unbounded—when pharmaceutical companies are allowed to
provide physicians with whatever information the company wants. Former U.S.
Representative Henry Waxman, who was a ranking member of the House
Committee on Government Reform and a senior member of the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce, both of which have jurisdiction over the
FDA, wrote that prior to the Kefauver-Harris Amendments—and the FDA’s
ability to ensure safety and effectiveness of drugs including through
misbranding prosecutions—drug companies’ promotional claims about
unproven uses were “inherently misleading” for several reasons: promotional
information from manufacturers often fails to provide information about
negative studies, data may be presented as if it is of high scientific quality when
it is not, cited studies may be from low quality or foreign publications, and
statements or findings in studies may be taken out of context or interpreted more
favorably than the data show.124
Indeed, a 2006 study found that 21% of prescriptions were for uses not
approved by the FDA, and that 73% of those unapproved uses had little or no
scientific support.125 A more recent study shows that when medical trainees
interact with pharmaceutical representatives, the medical trainees that have
positive associations with these interactions are more likely to prescribe branded
drugs rather use evidence-based prescribing for their patients.126 In other words,
pharmaceutical marketers’ interactions with physicians (and would-be
physicians) generally lead physicians to move away from making decisions
based on accurate, fulsome scientific information. This is because promotional
information provided to physicians has a marketing purpose and when it is not
limited by rules that ensure its accuracy and truthfulness, can be said to be
inherently misleading.
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Even when information provided to physicians is not promotional, but
reflects preliminary research into the safety and effectiveness of a drug for a
certain use, it may be misleading. In order to assess the safety and effectiveness
of a drug or device for a particular use, the FDA requires data from completed
clinical trials and results keyed to specific identified endpoints.127 This is
because many devices and drugs that initially appear promising based on early
stage research ultimately fail to show clinical benefit in later phase research.128
In one study, the authors found that more than half of drugs entering late-stage
clinical development fail during or after pivotal clinical trials, mainly because
they turn out not to be effective, safe, or both.129 Thus, at a preliminary phase,
scientific data may show some evidence of a link between a drug and some
positive effect, but may not be sufficient to draw inferences or conclusions that
the drug is safe and effective.130 For this reason, such early stage information
may be considered misleading. As the FDA has put it, “A firm communication
that conveys scientific information that is not truthful, complete, or balanced or
that lacks scientific validity has at least the potential to mislead the audience and
does not contribute meaningfully to the marketplace of ideas.”131
The Caronia case is instructive. The “data” that Caronia provided to his
physicians was not published, never mind in a reputable, peer-reviewed journal,
and was, to say the least, highly preliminary. Caronia told one physician that
because of Xyrem’s “properties,” “it’s going to insomnia, Fibromyalgia[,]
periodic leg movement, restless leg.”132 He also discussed studies that
presumably the company was just then undertaking and had not completed: “also
looking at . . . Parkinson’s and . . . other sleep disorders are underway such as
MS.”133 Other information Caronia and his partner relayed to doctors was
completely anecdotal: “I’ve had people under thirteen and I’ve certainly talked
127
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to neurologists that have narcoleptics . . . between eight and ten . . .”134 None of
this information was per se false; it may be true that Xyrem’s properties make it
promising for the indications Caronia mentioned; that the company was looking
into new indications; that other physicians were using it for children even when
it had not been approved for that use. But the information provided does not
show that Xyrem is safe and effective for any of these uses and does not allow
the doctor to fully evaluate and decide for himself whether the drug was, in fact,
safe and effective for these uses. Caronia’s intent was to convince the physicians
that Xyrem was safe and effective for the non-approved uses, when, in fact, he
provided no scientifically reliable information to show that it was. So, while his
statements were literally truthful, they had a high probability of misleading.
Since misbranding prosecutions prevent such statements, they do not offend the
First Amendment, and the Caronia court erred in finding otherwise.
The quality of the truthfulness of the information that is being curtailed
makes a misbranding case like Caronia distinguishable from Virginia Bd. of
Pharmacy, Western States, and Sorrell. The speech that misbranding
prosecutions impinge upon indirectly is not of the same “truthful” quality as the
speech at issue in these Supreme Court cases. In Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy, the
information that was banned was drug pricing information. This information is
either true or false—an advertised price either is or is not the price the pharmacist
will charge the consumer for the drug—and is verifiable. When it is true, the
information necessarily contributes to consumers’ ability to make rational
economic decisions (compare and contrast pharmacy prices) without any risk of
misleading. In Western States, the information that was essentially banned
concerned what drugs the pharmacist compounded (or the fact that a certain
pharmacist was compounding a certain drug). Again, this information is either
truthful or is not, and is verifiable. If a pharmacist advertises that she compounds
Drug X, she either does or doesn’t. In Sorrell, the data compilations showing
physicians’ drug prescribing habits are also inherently truthful; they merely
report the drugs and quantities physicians have actually prescribed, and again,
are verifiable. While access to the information may lead to “bad” behavior, like
harassing physicians, the information itself is not misleading.
This is not so with promotional information concerning the unapproved uses
of drugs. This information is complicated, nuanced, and capable of
manipulation. It is also not always, or even usually, verifiable. This is because it
is the pharmaceutical company that has access to all of the positive and negative
scientific information about the drug, making it difficult for the government, or
134
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a physician, to ascertain whether the information provided is accurate and
reliable.135 As one commentator has noted, “To prove the truth or falsehood of
any one claim about drug-disease efficacy would cost millions of dollars and
years of research by dozens of investigators and many thousands of patients
taking the drug and/or placebo, at real risk of side effects and often at real
opportunity cost, compared to other treatments the patients could have tried
instead.”136
Thus, promotional information about off-label uses of drugs does not
inherently “flow cleanly.”137 For this reason, the FDA’s safe harbors allow
dissemination of the most accurate, reliable information, but promotional
information that falls outside of the safe harbors—information that is not
supported by independent, scientifically valid studies, medical research or wellestablished clinical practice guidelines—the type of information that Caronia
was providing to physicians—is prohibited. “[T]he FDA’s current regulatory
approach does not impose a blanket prohibition on off-label promotion, but
instead focuses on those forms of communication that are most amenable to
corruption.”138 Thus, to the extent that misbranding prosecutions, and the FDA’s
provision of safe harbors, ensures that off-label information provided to
physicians is “clean,” meaning it is accurate, reliable, and truthful, such
prosecutions should not—and do not—raise First Amendment concerns.
For the Caronia court to assume that the first Central Hudson factor was
satisfied—that the speech indirectly affected by misbranding prosecutions is
truthful and not misleading—was wrong. In fact, the FDA has a strong argument
that misbranding prosecutions, if they implicate speech at all, implicate a type
of speech that has a strong probability of misleading. As such, they meet the first
Central Hudson test and are permissible under the First Amendment.

2. The FDA’s Current Regulatory Scheme Advances the Government’s
Interests in Protecting the Public Health & Safety by Ensuring the
Safety and Effectiveness of Pharmaceutical and Medical Device
Products
The second and third parts of the Central Hudson test look at whether there
are substantial government interests underlying the law or regulation at issue and
135
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whether those interests are furthered by the law or regulation. The Caronia court
summarily noted the substantial interest underlying the FDA’s regulatory
regime. It said: “[T]he government’s asserted interests in drug safety and public
health are substantial. Specifically, the government asserts an interest in
preserving the effectiveness and integrity of the FDCA’s drug approval process,
and an interest in reducing patient exposure to unsafe and effective drugs.”139
But the Court held that the government’s construction of the FDCA to prohibit
off-label promotion did not advance those interests because physicians are
allowed to prescribe drugs for off-label uses, and “prohibiting off-label
promotion by a pharmaceutical manufacturer while simultaneously allowing
off-label use ‘paternalistically’ interferes with the ability of physicians and
patients to receive potentially relevant treatment information; such barriers to
information about off-label use could inhibit, to the public’s detriment, informed
and intelligent treatment decisions.”140 The court noted that “in the fields of
medicine and public health, ‘where information can save lives,’ it only furthers
the public interest to ensure that decisions about the use of prescription drugs,
including off-label usage, are intelligent and well-informed.”141 Finally, the
court concluded that “[i]f the government’s objective is to shepherd physicians
to prescribe drugs only on-label, criminalizing manufacturer promotion of offlabel use while permitting others to promote such use to physicians is an indirect
and questionably effective means to achieve that goal.”142
The court’s reasoning is flawed for numerous reasons. First, it assumes that
the government’s main purpose is to “shepherd physicians to prescribe drugs
only on-label.” This construction of the government’s interest not only is overly
simplistic, but is wrong. Second, the court assumed, following Supreme Court
precedent, that in the realm of drug promotional activity and medical
prescribing, more information equals more truth and that the “marketplace of
ideas” helps physicians become better decisionmakers. But, as explained below,
this reasoning is incorrect in a marketplace where all the actors do not have equal
access to information and the decisionmaker has no way to properly verify the
accuracy or reliability of the information being provided. It may be that medicine
and drugs “save lives,” but in an inefficient market, off-label prescribing actually
leads to more adverse events, not life saving. The FDA’s regulatory scheme
ensures that patients get life-saving treatments and guarantees that purported
life-saving medicines do what they promise to do.
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The Caronia court’s notion that the government’s main interest is to
encourage physicians not to write off-label prescriptions is incorrect. The
government’s purpose in the way it interprets and enforces the FDCA is to
ensure that drugs that are placed on the market are safe and effective and that
information provided for uses of those drugs that have not yet been proven safe
and effective, but which may nevertheless help patients, is accurate, reliable, and
not misleading. As the FDA explained in its recent memo, the FDA has “sought
to strike a careful balance, supporting medical decision-making for patients in
the absence of better options, but doing so without undermining the measures
designed to incentivize the development and approval/clearance of medical
products that would reduce the need to rely on unapproved use, in light of its
risks.”143
By myopically focusing on a supposed governmental interest in
“shepherding” physicians towards prescribing on-label, the Caronia court
ignored the complex, multi-faceted interests that the FDA seeks to protect.
While it is true that the FDA “prefers” on-label prescriptions because those
prescriptions are for uses that have been proven to be safe and effective, and thus
do not put at risk the public health, on the other side of the coin, the FDA wants
to incentivize drug companies to do the clinical trials that are necessary to show
a new use is safe and effective. To do so, the FDA uses both a carrot and a stick.
The carrot is patent protection: not only do drug manufacturers get five years of
patent exclusivity when the FDA approves a new drug, but every time the
manufacturer receives approval for a new use of the drug, the patent exclusivity
is extended for three years.144 The stick is misbranding prosecutions. Without
both, the government’s interest in ensuring that all medically helpful uses of a
drug are explored fully and properly in clinical trials is illusory.
The FDA has articulated its interests to include: (1) motivating the
development of “robust scientific data on safety and efficacy”; (2) protecting
against fraud, misrepresentation, and bias and preventing the diversion of
limited health care resources towards ineffective treatment; (3) ensuring drug
and device labeling is accurate and informative; (4) protecting human subjects
receiving experimental treatments; (5) ensuring informed consent; (6)
maintaining incentives for clinical trial participation; (7) promoting
development of products for underserved patients; and (8) supporting informed
decision-making for patient treatment.145 Any court that evaluates the
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government’s substantial interests and whether they are furthered by the FDA’s
regulatory scheme must take into account all of these various factors. The
Caronia court paid lip service to “the government’s asserted interests in drug
safety and public health,” its interest “in preserving the effectiveness and
integrity of the FDCA’s drug approval process, and an interest in reducing
patient exposure to unsafe and effective drugs.”146 But when it came down to
analyzing whether the regulatory regime advanced that interest, the court
actually defined the interest very narrowly, ignoring the number and complexity
of the interests involved.
The Caronia court also erred by assuming, as most First Amendment cases
do, that more information is better. Indeed, in Sorrell, the Supreme Court
credited the testimony of a Vermont physician who said “information is power.
And the more you know, or anyone knows, the better decisions can be made.”147
And the Court characterized Vermont’s law as being motivated by an
impermissible “fear that people would make bad decisions if given truthful
information.”148 But when it comes to pharmaceutical company marketing of
drugs for off-label uses, information is not necessarily power because the market
is inefficient: the decisionmakers do not have access to all the information
necessary to make a well-informed decision. Moreover, the issue is not the
government’s fear that physicians would make bad decisions (e.g. a decision to
prescribe a drug off-label) if given truthful information, but whether the
information can really be considered “truthful” when it is not inherently so and
is not capable of being verified or tested.
As stated above, unlike drug prices, or information related to whether a
compounding pharmacist compounds a specific drug, pharmaceutical
companies’ communications about off-label promotion are neither inherently
truthful nor verifiable. When promotional information about an off-label use is
provided to a physician, it is not one piece of information that adds to other
information available to the physician about that use to provide a complete
picture and allow rational decision-making. Instead, while there may be other
published information about the off-label use that can help a physician decide
whether she ought to prescribe the drug in that manner, more often than not,
there is no complete, scientifically reliable picture available to the doctor.
Physicians are provided off-label information by the drug companies, but often
do not even know what the approved indications are, and have a hard time
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keeping up with “rapidly changing medication information.”149 As one
commentator has explained:
This is not a transparent, efficient market, where buyers evaluate the
value of products themselves. Even learned and earnest physicians are
little help on their own when the underlying science is missing. After
all, no individual physician could find it rational to perform . . . a
randomized trial of the drug merely to assess its utility in her own
practice. This is a classic collective action problem. 150

Thus, misbranding prosecutions do not constitute a paternalistic effort to protect
physicians from bad decision-making; they are part of a regulatory scheme that
protects physicians from “bad”—incomplete, inaccurate, unverifiable—
information.
The Caronia court’s notion that “information saves lives” is also not borne
out by the evidence when it comes to off-label marketing and prescribing. First,
because off-label uses are not proven to be safe and effective, they are,
predictably, more strongly associated with adverse events than on-label use. A
Canadian study that analyzed three years of physician-prescribing data from
2012-2015 showed that 11.8% of the prescriptions were for off-label use.151 In
80.9% of these cases, the off-label uses lacked strong scientific evidence.152 The
researchers found that the adverse event rate—the rate at which drug use was
terminated due to an adverse or allergic reaction—for on-label use drugs was
12.5 per 10,000 person-months, while the adverse event rate for off-label use
was 19.7 per 10,000 person-months, which represents a 44% increase in the risk
for adverse events with off-label use.153 The study concluded that “[o]ff-label
drug use, and particularly off-label use without strong scientific evidence, is a
risk factor for [adverse drug events].”154
Further, the FDA’s safe harbors ensure that physicians are not completely
barred from getting information that could help save their patients’ lives. By
allowing pharmaceutical companies to provide information about off-label uses
from independent, peer-reviewed journals, medical reference texts, and even
clinical practice guidelines, the FDA ensures that physicians do have accurate,
reliable, evidence-based information about off-label uses of products so that
patients who have no other options can be provided possibly life-saving cures.
149
150
151
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Finally, the FDA’s regulatory scheme—now aided by the 21st Century Cures
Act—seeks to aid patients in need of last-resort treatment to get the drug
approvals they need and works toward making the clinical trial and subsequent
approval process more efficient. One argument for allowing off-label promotion
suggests that patients cannot get access to treatment because the costs of
engaging in clinical trials to support the approval of new uses is prohibitive. For
example, Lars Noah has argued that it seems unfair to prohibit drug
manufacturers from sharing information that “substantiates an appropriately
limited claim of safety and effectiveness” when an NDA would require “a
substantial investment of time and resources, averaging on the order of a dozen
years and over $1 billion.”155 He posits a hypothetical in which an anticoagulant
could be used off-label to treat Alzheimer’s, and claims it makes little sense for
the manufacturer to go through the expensive process of submitting a
supplemental new drug application in order to “await the Agency’s
imprimatur.”156 But real-world examples show how weak this argument is.
Eliquis, an anticoagulant, made its manufacturer Bristol-Myers Squibb $602
million in the last quarter of 2015.157 BMS’ total revenue for the period was
$4.29 billion and for that year, close to $17 billion.158 A similar drug, Xarelto,
earned its manufacturers $3.7 billion in 2014159 and brought in $819 million in
revenue in the first quarter of 2017.160 The notion that if, hypothetically, either
of these drugs could cure Alzheimer’s, it would be prohibitive for these
manufacturers to expend $1 billion over the course of 12 years to do the clinical
trials necessary to gain FDA approval for the use is laughable. The reality is that
investing $1 billion on clinical trials in order to support a new drug application
is not, relatively speaking, a huge investment for these companies. Such
investments are often recovered within just a few years of a new drug (or a new
use) coming to market.
Further, the FDA has several programs that expedite the approval process
for life-saving treatments so that there is not, in fact, a 12-year wait for approval:
the Orphan Drug Designation program, the Rare Pediatric Disease Priority
155
Greene & Noah, supra note 6, at 249 (citing Lars Noah, Law, Medicine, and Medical Technology 260–
674, 270–71 (3d ed. 2012)).
156
Id. at 250.
157
See http://www.fiercepharma.com/special-report/18-eliquis (last visited July 16, 2007).
158
Bristol-Myers Squibb, Press Release, Bristol-Myers Squibb Reports Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2015
Financial Results, available at https://news.bms.com/press-release/financial-news/bristol-myers-squibbreports-fourth-quarter-and-full-year-2015-financia (last visited July 16, 2017).
159
See http://www.pmlive.com/top_pharma_list/Top_50_pharmaceutical_products_by_global_sales (last
visited July 16, 2017).
160
Ludwig Burger, Stroke drug Xarelto, plastics lift Bayer earnings, Reuters, Apr. 27, 2017, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-bayer-results-idUSKBN17T0OE (last visited, July 16, 2017).
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Review Voucher program, the Humanitarian Use Device program, and three
extramural grant programs.161 The 21st Century Cures Act also aims to drive
down the costs of clinical trials by pharmaceutical companies by incentivizing
the FDA to modernize and improve efficiency in clinical trial design. And it
establishes new channels for pharmaceutical companies to more quickly and
efficiently have life-saving products approved. For example, it establishes a
Limited Population pathway, which streamlines development programs for
certain antibacterials and antifungals intended to treat targeted groups of patients
suffering from serious or life-threatening infections where there is a lack of
available therapies.162
In short, the Caronia court was incorrect in asserting that the FDA’s primary
goal is to stop off-label prescribing and to therefore assume that the agency’s
construction and enforcement of the FDCA fails to further that goal. In doing
so, it failed to fully credit the Supreme Court’s finding that “[p]reserving the
effectiveness and integrity of the FDCA’s new drug approval process is clearly
an important governmental interest, and the Government has every reason to
want as many drugs as possible to be subject to that approval process.”163 The
FDA has strong arguments for why the structure of its regulatory regime furthers
its substantial interest, meeting the second and third Central Hudson factors.

3. The FDA’s Regulatory Scheme Is Tailored to Protect and Effectuate
the Government’s Interests
Once the Caronia court narrowly characterized the government’s interest as
limiting off-label promotions, it was easy enough for it to conclude that
misbranding prosecutions were not a good fit for effectuating that purpose. But
given that the FDA’s purposes are both broader and more complex than the
Caronia court’s construction, it is difficult to argue that there is some better,
more narrowly tailored way to adequately balance all of the relevant competing
interests.

161
See FDA, Guidance for Industry, Expedited Programs for Serious Conditions – Drugs and Biologics
(May 2014), available at http://www fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/
guidances/ucm358301.pdf; FDA, Developing Products for Rare Diseases & Conditions, at http://www.fda.
gov/ForIndustry/DevelopingProductsforRareDiseasesConditions/ucm2005525.htm (last updated Jan. 5, 2017).
162
Robert M. Califf, 21st Century Cures Act: Making Progress on Shared Goals for Patients, FDA Voice,
Dec. 13, 2016, available at https://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/2016/12/21st-century-cures-act-makingprogress-on-shared-goals-for-patients/ (last visited July 16, 2017).
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Western States, 535 U.S. at 369.
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Generally, when a court finds that a law, statute, or regulation is not
adequately tailored to a government purpose, it is because it can think of other,
more narrow, less constitutionally offensive means to effectuate the purpose.
The Caronia court came up with its own suggestions for policies that it believed
would better fit the government’s purposes. The majority suggested that the
government “could guide physicians and patients in differentiating between
misleading and false promotion, exaggerations and embellishments, and truthful
or non-misleading information.”164 Or it “could develop its warning or
disclaimer systems, or develop safety tiers within the off-label market, to
distinguish between drugs.”165 The majority also suggested that the government
could “require pharmaceutical manufacturers to list all applicable or intended
indications when they first apply for FDA approval.”166 It also proposed that the
government could include ceilings or caps on off-label prescriptions.167 And, the
majority noted that “where off-label drug use is exceptionally concerning, the
government could prohibit the off-label use altogether.”168 But as Judge
Livingston pointed out in her dissent, none of the majority’s alternatives would
be “similarly effective” in advancing the government’s interests.169
The majority’s suggestion that the government could provide guidance to
physicians and patients in differentiating between misleading and false
promotion, exaggerations and embellishments, and truthful or non-misleading
information is flawed because, as stated above, even the government does not
have enough information to necessarily know what information is accurate and
reliable, and what information is not. Indeed, this suggestion is marred by the
assumption that off-label promotional claims can necessarily be verified. Until
randomized clinical trials are complete, the safety and effectiveness of a drug
cannot be established. Thus, providing “guidance” to help physicians and
patients differentiate is neither logical nor feasible.
The FDA has also argued that the proposal is not feasible and would not
further the agency’s interest in assuring that drug uses get adequate premarket
review because it would “replace the FDA’s thorough and rigorous scientific
review process with a review of promotional materials by health care providers
and patients.”170 The agency has also pointed out that health care providers and
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patients “cannot be expected to acquire the tools, background, and specialized
expertise in statistics, pharmacokinetics, biomedical engineering and other fields
that are necessary to conduct a thorough evaluation of the risks and benefits of
a new intended use that even roughly approaches that provided by FDA review
(assuming that adequate data exist and that all the data are made publicly
available).”171 Further, “it is unrealistic to suggest that a government-sponsored
education campaign would provide this kind of multi-discipline expertise.”172
Likewise, a warning or disclaimer system would “provide manufacturers
much less incentive to submit their drugs for FDA approval, and in turn [would]
encourage promotion based on data much less reliable than the clinical
investigations required” by the FDA’s regulations.173 Warnings are also not very
effective. In a study of disclaimers on dietary supplements, the researchers found
“ample evidence that such disclaimers are often misunderstood or ignored by
consumers and had no effect on consumers’ ability to understand messages
about health care products and critically evaluate potentially unsupported
statements about effectiveness or safety.”174
As for requiring pharmaceutical manufacturers to list all applicable or
intended indications when they first apply for FDA approval,175 the FDA has
noted that “it is not possible to divine all potential uses of a medical product
from an initial study; data and information develop over time through scientific
study before and after product approval, as well as [through] product use.”176
Moreover, implementing this requirement would likely mean that initial
applications would be significantly delayed while new indications were
explored, and once a drug was approved, there would be no incentive for
manufacturers to continue important research that could lead to the development
and approval of new treatments.177
Putting in place ceilings or caps on off-label prescriptions would “not align
with any discernable government interest and would adversely affect the public
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Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., Mandatory Disclaimers on Dietary Supplements Do Not Reliably
Communicate the Intended Issues, 34 HEALTH AFFAIRS 438, 445 (2015); see also Aaron S. Kesselhiem, Offlabel Drug Use and Promotion: Balancing Public Health Goals and Commercial Speech, 37 AM. J.L. & MED.
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health.”178 As the FDA points out in its Memorandum, it is unclear how a ceiling
or cap would be determined, and by what public health rationale:
If the unapproved use is thought to be potentially harmful for patients,
how would one ascertain and justify the number of patients who can
be exposed to the unapproved use? And if the unapproved use is
thought to be potentially positive, how would one justify denying all
other patients access to the product for the unapproved use after the
cap is reached?179

Indeed, this suggestion is so arbitrary and capricious, it would likely not even
pass rational basis review, much less the heightened scrutiny standard required
by Central Hudson.
Finally, the Caronia majority’s suggestion that the government could
prohibit off-label use altogether also raises constitutional concerns. As Judge
Livingston noted, “it would constitute an unprecedented intrusion into the
practice of medicine, and would result in perhaps an even greater restriction on
speech.”180 While the approach would be “extremely effective in protecting the
government interests in motivating scientifically robust research into
unapproved uses and ensuring that new uses of approved/cleared medical
products are proven safe and effective before they are used to treat patients,” it
would not “take into account the public health interests behind allowing health
care providers and patients to work to determine the best treatment options for
each patient in specific circumstances.”181 There are certain populations of
patients for whom there are few, or even no, approved uses for their condition.182
These patients would be left with no options under the court’s proposed
“solution.”
In sum, none of the Caronia majority’s suggestions as adequately addresses
the government’s interests as the current regulatory system. The court’s
willingness to judge the system not to be tailored to the government’s interest
by substituting the court’s own judgment for the agency’s experience and
expertise illustrates how problematic such judicial activism can be with respect
to a complex regulatory environment. A court only has the briefs before it—it
178
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does not have the expertise or the experience, the hours of testimony, or the help
of experts to try to craft a complex system that balances many different interests
while remaining constitutionally sound. This, of course, was one of Judge
Rehnquist’s concerns in his dissent in Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy.183 And it was
also Justice Breyer’s concern in his dissents in Western States and Sorrell.184 In
Sorrell, Justice Breyer worried: “The Court reaches its conclusion . . . without
taking full account of the regulatory context, the nature of the speech effects, the
values these First Amendment categories seek to promote, and prior precedent.
At best the Court opens a Pandora’s Box of First Amendment challenges to
many ordinary regulatory practices that may only incidentally affect a
commercial message. At worst, it reawakens Lochner’s pre-New Deal threat of
substituting judicial for democratic decisionmaking where ordinary economic
regulation is at issue.”185
Western States and its aftermath illustrate the consequences that ensue when
a court substitutes its own judgment for that of the legislature and an expert
agency. In Western States, Justice O’Connor insisted that the FDA could use
“non-speech-related means of drawing a line between compounding and largescale manufacturing”186 and held that a provision in section 503A, which
allowed compounding pharmacies to avoid the NDA process as long as they did
not advertise, to violate the First Amendment. After Western States essentially
invalidated prohibitions on compounding pharmacy advertising, the FDA
determined that all of section 503A was invalid.187 Thereafter, many
compounding pharmacies grew to national scale.188 In 2012, hundreds of people
were sickened and dozens killed when they contracted fungal infections from
unsafe compounded steroid injections made in a Massachusetts compounding
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425 U.S. at 787 (arguing that drawing the line between “truthful” and “false and misleading” speech is
“too Procrustean to take into account the congeries of factors which I believe could, quite consistently with the
First and Fourteenth Amendments, properly influence a legislative decision with respect to commercial
advertising.”)
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Western States, 535 U.S. at 389 (arguing that the majority’s “overly rigid ‘commercial speech’ doctrine
will transform what ought to be a legislative or regulatory decision about the best way to protect the health and
safety of the American public into a constitutional decision prohibiting the legislature from enacting necessary
protections.”); Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 602–03.
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pharmacy that were sold and marketed nationwide.189 Western States shows that
the FDA’s concerns about the public health and safety were valid, and that using
nationwide advertising as a proxy for large-scale compounding in fact made
sense. It also shows that courts do not have expertise in divining solutions to
complex regulatory issues and may not be the best venue for deciding the quality
of truthfulness in commercial speech. Instead, these decisions should generally
be left to the legislature and the expert agency—here, the FDA.
In fact, the FDA’s regulatory scheme is tailored to protect the government’s
interests in the least restrictive manner possible. It argued this in Caronia, but
its argument is even stronger now, as the safe harbors for off-label promotion
are broader, allowing not only journal articles, but medical texts and clinical
practice guidelines with information about off-label uses of drugs to be shared
with physicians. And, under the 21st Century Cures Act, the companies may also
share health care economic data with certain entities related to an unapproved
use of a drug.
The FDA’s interpretation of the FDCA and its pursuit of misbranding
prosecutions ensures that the public is protected from the tragedies of Mellaril
and DES by incentivizing the drug companies to conduct thorough, scientifically
sound clinical trials that prove both safety and effectiveness for a particular use
of a drug before being able to market the drug for that use. But its decision not
to prohibit all off-label uses also protects the doctor-patient relationship and
ensures treatment for individuals with rare diseases. The safe harbors allow
pharmaceutical companies to share scientifically sound, evidence-based, and
therefore truthful, information about off-label uses with physicians, while
ensuring that incomplete, non-verifiable, biased, and otherwise misleading
information cannot be shared. This regime effectuates all of the government’s
substantial interests in a manner that is as least offensive as possible to the First
Amendment.

CONCLUSION
Although Caronia struck a harsh blow to the FDA’s efforts to ensure that
uses of drugs are proven safe and effective before they can be marketed, and
although it is not an entirely surprising decision given the Supreme Court’s
commercial speech jurisprudence, “fighting to ensure that a regulatory regime is
in place to promote accurate and unbiased promotional communications is a

189
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public health imperative.”190 Thus, while pharmaceutical and device companies
and their defenders will continue to complain that the current system is broken
and will use the First Amendment as a tool to try to further shatter it, the FDA
should not be cowed. In fact, the current regulatory system is not in need of
fixing, and certainly not of undoing. While the FDA could make some further
tweaks to strengthen its ability to argue that it is narrowly tailoring its regime to
be as least restrictive as possible,191 there is no need to give up on misbranding
prosecutions or False Claims Act cases.192 And there is also no need for
legislative “fixes” like the Medical Product Communications Act of 2017, which
would broaden companies’ ability to promote for off-label uses based on
information that is not evidence-based so as to undermine the premarket review
approval and clearance process. Indeed, the Medical Product Communications
Act of 2017 would take us back to the time before the Kefauver-Harris
amendments. By contrast, the current regulatory regime and the FDA’s
interpretation and enforcement of the FDCA, including through misbranding
prosecutions, strikes the right balance between ensuring that the tragedies that
took place prior to the Kefauver-Harris amendments do not recur and
encouraging physicians to provide the best, evidence-based treatments for their
patients. The FDA should stand by its regulatory regime and fight to ensure that
neither the courts nor the legislature undo it.
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